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Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers
MIKE BURKART, DENIS GROMB,
HOLGER M. MUELLER, and FAUSTO PANUNZI∗
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of legal investor protection for the eﬃciency of the market
for corporate control when bidders are financially constrained. In the model, stronger legal
investor protection increases bidders’ outside funding capacity. However, absent eﬀective
bidding competition, this does not improve eﬃciency, as the bid price–and thus the bidder’s
need for funds–increases one-for-one with his pledgeable income. In contrast, under eﬀective
competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity improves eﬃciency by
making it less likely that more eﬃcient but less wealthy bidders are outbid by less eﬃcient
but wealthier rivals.
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Building on the work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), several empirical studies have shown that
countries with stronger legal investor protection allocate resources more eﬃciently. For instance,
Wurgler (2000) shows that these countries increase investment more in growing industries–
and decrease it more in declining industries–relative to countries with weaker legal investor
protection. Likewise, McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) show that firms in these countries
exhibit a higher sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities and, as a result, enjoy higher
total factor productivity growth and higher profitability.
An important resource allocation mechanism is the takeover market. In that market, both
assets and managerial talent are reallocated across firms and industries. Indeed, consistent with
the empirical evidence that countries with stronger legal investor protection allocate resources
more eﬃciently, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that these countries also have more active takeover
markets.
Existing theory oﬀers little guidance as to why the takeover outcome might be more eﬃcient
in countries with stronger legal investor protection. This is for two reasons. First, takeover
models typically do not explicitly consider legal investor protection. Second, empirical research
suggests that legal investor protection matters primarily because it relaxes financing constraints
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2010).1 However–and in stark contrast
to the “standard” corporate finance model of investment (e.g., Tirole, 2006)–existing takeover
models typically assume that bidders are financially unconstrained (e.g., Grossman and Hart,
1980, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990; Burkart, Gromb, and
Panunzi, 1998, 2000; Mueller and Panunzi, 2004).2
To address this issue, we incorporate both legal investor protection and financing constraints
into a standard takeover model à la Grossman and Hart (1980). In that model, no individual
target shareholder perceives himself as pivotal for the outcome of a tender oﬀer, leading to
free-riding behavior. As a consequence, target shareholders tender only if the bid price reflects
1La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with stronger legal investor protection have larger external capital
markets and more IPOs. McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) show that firms in such countries exhibit both a lower
sensitivity of investment to cash flow–meaning they are less financially constrained–and a higher sensitivity of
either equity or debt issuance to q–meaning firms with better investment opportunities are better able to raise
outside funds.
2All these papers build on Grossman and Hart’s (1980) seminal analysis of the free-rider problem in takeovers.
While Chowdhry and Nanda (1993)–in a model that assumes no free-rider problem–and Mueller and Panunzi
(2004) examine the strategic role of debt financing in takeovers, neither of these two papers considers bidders’
financing constraints. In particular, this implies that–in contrast to the “standard” corporate finance model of
investment–bidders’ own resources are immaterial for eﬃciency.
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the full post-takeover share value (Bradley, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1980).3 However, if the
bidder cannot make a profit on tendered shares, value-increasing takeovers may not take place.
As Grossman and Hart argue, one way for the bidder to make a profit is by diverting corporate
resources as private benefits after gaining control. Private benefits extraction lowers the post-
takeover share value and thus the price which the bidder must oﬀer target shareholders to induce
them to tender.
In our model, legal investor protection limits the ease with which the bidder, once in control,
can divert corporate resources as private benefits. This has two main implications. First, it
reduces the bidder’s profit from the takeover, thus making eﬃcient takeovers less likely. Second,
it raises the post-takeover share value, thus increasing the bidder’s pledgeable income and, by
implication, his outside funding capacity. However, absent eﬀective bidding competition, this
increased outside funding capacity does not relax the bidder’s budget constraint. As the bid
price increases in lockstep with the post-takeover share value–to induce target shareholders
to tender their shares–the bidder’s need for funds increases one-for-one with his pledgeable
income, thus oﬀsetting any positive eﬀect of legal investor protection on his outside funding
capacity.
The conclusion that legal investor protection does not relax the bidder’s budget constraint is
disconcerting. After all, empirical research suggests that one of the main eﬀects of legal investor
protection is that it eases financing constraints. However, this conclusion follows naturally from
any setting in which the bid price adjusts in lockstep with the post-takeover share value and
thus with the bidder’s pledgeable income. Turning this result on its head, if the bid price did not
adjust in lockstep with the bidder’s pledgeable income, then the positive eﬀect of legal investor
protection on the bidder’s outside funding capacity might have implications for eﬃciency.
While several factors might break this one-for-one relationship between the bid price and the
bidder’s pledgeable income, we focus here on one that we think is particularly relevant: bidding
competition, whereby bidders are forced to make oﬀers exceeding the post-takeover share value.
3Rossi and Volpin (2004) provide empirical support for the free-rider hypothesis by showing that bid premia
in tender oﬀers are higher than in alternative takeover modes. They conclude (p. 293): “We interpret the
finding on tender oﬀers as evidence of the free-rider hypothesis: that is, the bidder in a tender oﬀer needs to
pay a higher premium to induce shareholders to tender their shares.” In a recent empirical study, Bodnaruk et
al. (2011) provide more direct evidence in support of the free-rider hypothesis. Precisely, they show that: (i)
takeover premia are higher when the target’s share ownership is more widely dispersed, and (ii) firms with more
widely dispersed share ownership are less likely to become takeover targets. Both findings are consistent with
“finite-shareholder” versions of the free-rider model (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988; Holmström and Nalebuﬀ,
1992; Gromb, 1992).
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Given that private benefits are not pledgeable, oﬀers exceeding the post-takeover share value
must be partly funded out of the bidders’ own funds. Consequently, the takeover outcome may
not only depend on bidders’ willingness to pay–i.e., their valuations of the target–but also on
their ability to pay.
If bidders are arbitrarily wealthy, the takeover outcome depends exclusively on their will-
ingness to pay. This is the situation analyzed in much of the theory of takeovers. As the most
eﬃcient bidder–i.e., the one who creates the most value–has the highest valuation of the tar-
get, he can always outbid less eﬃcient rivals. Thus, absent financial constraints, the takeover
outcome is always eﬃcient.
By contrast, if bidders are financially constrained, the takeover outcome may be ineﬃcient.
To illustrate, suppose there are two bidders, bidder 1 and bidder 2 The target value is normalized
to zero. If bidder 1 gains control, the target value increases to 100 while if bidder 2 gains control,
it increases only to 90 Thus, bidder 1 is more eﬃcient. Suppose next that both bidders can,
once in control, divert the same fraction of firm value, say, 30 percent, as private benefits. Hence,
if bidder 1 gains control, the post-takeover share value is 70 and his private benefits are 30
Similarly, if bidder 2 gains control, the post-takeover share value is 63 and his private benefits
are 27 Thus, bidder 1 is not only more eﬃcient, but he can also raise more outside funds: Bidder
1’s outside funding capacity is 70 while bidder 2’s outside funding capacity is only 63 (Recall
that private benefits are not pledgeable.) And yet, bidder 2 may win the takeover contest.
Specifically, assume bidder 1 has no private wealth, while bidder 2 has private wealth of 8 In
this case, bidder 1 is able to pay 70 for the target, but bidder 2 is able to pay 71: He can raise
63 from outside investors and use 8 of his own wealth. Consequently, bidder 2 can outbid his
more eﬃcient rival, bidder 1 and win the takeover contest.4
Accordingly, if bidders are financially constrained, the takeover outcome may not only de-
pend on their ability to create value but also on their private wealth. In particular, if the less
eﬃcient bidder–i.e., the one who creates less value–is wealthier, the takeover outcome may be
ineﬃcient. In this case, stronger legal investor protection may improve eﬃciency. To continue
with the above example, suppose that legal investor protection is now such that bidders can
divert only 10 percent of the firm value (versus 30 percent before). As a consequence, bidder 1’s
outside funding capacity is now 90 while bidder 2’s outside funding capacity is only 81 If the
4Bidder 1 is willing to pay up to 100 for the target, while bidder 2 is willing to pay up to 90. Hence, if the
bidders were financially unconstrained, bidder 1 would always win the takeover contest.
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bidders’ private wealth is the same as before, this implies that bidder 1 can now pay 90 for the
target, while bidder 2 can only pay 81+ 8 = 89 Thus, bidder 1 can now outbid his less eﬃcient
rival, bidder 2
We explore a number of implications of this argument, both normative and positive. First,
we examine the role of financing frictions, such as margin requirements (“haircuts”) and shadow
costs of internal funds. As we show, while margin requirements impair the eﬃciency of the
takeover outcome, shadow costs of internal funds improve it. Intuitively, margin requirements
reduce a bidder’s capacity to raise outside funds, which hurts more eﬃcient (but less wealthy)
bidders relatively more. In contrast, shadow costs of internal funds hurt less eﬃcient (but
wealthy) bidders relatively more by making it more costly for them to draw on their internal
funds. Our model predicts that the positive eﬀect of legal investor protection on the takeover
outcome is weaker when margin requirements are high and internal funds command a high
shadow cost.
Our model also sheds new light on the “one share—one vote” rule, which stipulates that all
shares have equal voting rights. The leading argument in support of this rule is that it minimizes
the likelihood that more eﬃcient bidders with low private benefits are outbid by less eﬃcient
rivals with high private benefits (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988). Naturally,
this argument does not apply in our model, as the most eﬃcient bidder is also the one with
the highest private benefits. Nonetheless, a “one share—one vote” rule is optimal in our model,
because it minimizes the likelihood that more eﬃcient but less wealthy bidders are outbid by
less eﬃcient but wealthier rivals. Our model predicts that deviations from “one share—one vote”
are more detrimental to eﬃciency when legal investor protection is weak.
We also analyze situations in which a bidder seeks to acquire a majority of the target shares
from an incumbent blockholder. Eﬀectively, the incumbent is like a rival bidder who is arbitrarily
wealthy: He can always “aﬀord” the controlling block by simply refusing to sell it. Our model
predicts that eﬃcient sales of control are more likely to succeed when legal investor protection
is strong and the incumbent’s controlling block is large. In a second step, we endogenize the
(optimal) size of the incumbent’s controlling block and find it to be larger when legal investor
protection is weak. This latter result is consistent with empirical evidence by La Porta et al.
(1998, 1999) showing that ownership is more concentrated in countries with weaker legal investor
protection.
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We next examine issues related to cross-border M&A. In particular, we show that if bidders
from diﬀerent countries compete for a target, those from countries with stronger legal investor
protection enjoy a strategic advantage. Our model predicts that takeover premia in cross-border
M&A deals are increasing in the quality of legal investor protection in the acquirer’s country,
consistent with empirical evidence by Bris and Cabolis (2008).
Finally, we show that firm-level governance–i.e., institutions that limit private benefits
extraction–can improve the eﬃciency of the takeover outcome. Indeed, if the cost of setting
up such institutions is suﬃciently low, it may render both legal investor protection and bidders’
private wealth redundant. Our model predicts the strenght of firm-level governance to be de-
creasing in its own cost, the bidder’s wealth, and the strenght of legal investor protection, and
increasing in the value created by the bidder.
A recurrent theme in this paper is that legal investor protection helps eﬃcient but less wealthy
bidders. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006, AW) obtain a related result. In their model, a penniless
entrepreneur needs to fund a fixed setup cost to establish a firm. If the entrepreneur fails, the
firm is set up by a wealthy but less eﬃcient family. Stronger legal investor protection increases
the entrepreneur’s outside funding capacity and–since the funding needs are fixed–relaxes his
budget constraint. This eﬀect of legal investor protection also holds true in our model, but only
holding funding needs constant. However, central to our analysis is the feature that not only
funding capacity but also funding needs are endogenous to legal investor protection–i.e., legal
investor protection aﬀects both sides of the budget constraint. This is true both in the single-
bidder case (because the bid price increases in lockstep with the bidder’s pledgeable income)
and in our competition model (because the rival’s maximum bid depends on legal investor
protection).
Essentially, AW’s model is akin to our single-bidder model but assuming a fixed bid price.
(In AW, the family does not really compete with the entrepreneur; it merely has a second pick
on the project if the entrepreneur fails to fund it.) Because of this diﬀerence, the two models
yield opposite results. In AW’s model, stronger legal investor protection improves eﬃciency
by making it more likely that the (more eﬃcient) entrepreneur can finance the project’s fixed
cost. In contrast, in our single-bidder model, stronger legal investor protection does not improve
eﬃciency, as the bid price–the equivalent of the project’s cost–adjusts in lockstep. Indeed,
stronger legal investor protection makes eﬃcient takeovers less likely by reducing the bidder’s
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profit from the takeover.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I lays out the basic model. Section II analyzes the
single-bidder case, while Section III examines that of “eﬀective” bidding competition. Section
IV considers financing frictions, such as margin requirements (“haircuts”) and shadow costs of
internal funds, as well as the role of asset tangibility. Section V examines the optimal security-
voting structure, sales of controlling blocks, and cross-border M&A. Section VI studies the
interplay between legal investor protection and firm-level governance. Section VII concludes.
All remaining proofs are in the Appendix.
I. The Model
We consider a model of takeovers in which potential acquirers are financially constrained.
Suppose a firm (“target”) faces a potential acquirer (“bidder”). The target has a measure one
continuum of shares which are dispersed among many small shareholders. (Section V.B considers
the case in which the target has a controlling shareholder.) All shares have equal voting rights.
(Section V.A considers departures from “one share—one vote.”) Shareholders are homogeneous,
everybody is risk neutral, and there is no discounting.
The target value is normalized to zero. If the bidder gains control of the target, its value
increases to   0 To gain control, the bidder must make a tender oﬀer to the target shareholders
that attracts at least a majority of the shares. (The bidder has no initial stake in the target.)
Target shareholders are atomistic in the sense that no individual shareholder perceives himself
as pivotal for the outcome of the tender oﬀer. Tender oﬀers are conditional on acquiring at least
a majority of the shares and unrestricted in the sense that the bidder must acquire any and all
shares beyond this threshold.5 If the tender oﬀer is successful, the bidder incurs a monetary
execution cost   0 that cannot be imposed on either the target or its shareholders–that is,
unless the target is fully owned by the bidder, in which case the assumption becomes irrelevant.6
Even if a control transfer is eﬃcient (  ) it may not take place. As Bradley (1980) and
Grossman and Hart (1980) show, if no individual target shareholder perceives himself as pivotal
5 Introducing restricted bids into our framework would neither aﬀect the takeover outcome nor the payoﬀs to
the bidder and the target shareholders.
6With multiple bidders, it is important that the execution cost is only incurred by the winning bidder.
Otherwise, at least when the bidding outcome is deterministic, there would never be any bidding competition,
because the losing bidder would not break even.
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for the outcome of the tender oﬀer, eﬃcient takeovers will not materialize unless the bidder
can extract private benefits of control. Accordingly, we assume that after gaining control, the
bidder can divert a fraction (1−) of the target value as private benefits, where  ∈ £¯ 1¤. For
simplicity, we assume that the extraction of private benefits involves no deadweight loss. Thus,
the bidder’s private benefits are (1−) while the security benefits accruing to all shareholders
are  Importantly, the extraction of private benefits cannot be contracted upon. This implies
that the bidder cannot commit to a given level of private benefits, nor can he transfer or pledge
these benefits to third parties (e.g., investors).7 Instead, the legal environment–captured by
the parameter ¯–eﬀectively limits diversion, with larger values of ¯ corresponding to stronger
legal investor protection.
Our assumption that private benefits are not pledgeable, while security benefits are fully
pledgeable, simplifies the exposition but is stronger than necessary. Indeed, it suﬃces to assume
that private benefits are “less pledegable” than security benefits. This is plausible, especially
if private benefits come (partly) in the form of consumption (e.g., perks) or are obtained in
“semi-legal” ways.
In practice, there are diﬀerent ways of how a controlling shareholder can extract private
benefits at the expense of other investors. For instance, he can sell target assets or output below
their market value to another company he owns. Alternatively, he can pay himself an artifi-
cially high salary or consume perks while declaring them as business expenses. Johnson et al.
(2000) describe how–even in countries like France, Belgium, and Italy–controlling sharehold-
ers can extract private benefits by transferring company resources to themselves (“tunneling”).
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002), Atanasov (2005), and
Mironov (2012) provide further examples of tunneling from India, Korea, Bulgaria, and Russia,
respectively.8
To study the financing of takeovers, we assume that the bidder has internal funds  ≥ 0
In addition, the bidder can raise outside funds  ≥ 0 from competitive investors. Since private
benefits are not pledgeable, the bidder’s outside funding capacity is limited by the value of his
7Our assumption that private benefits are not pledgeable rules out the possibility that the bidder can directly
pledge target assets as collateral even if he does not fully own the target, as discussed in Mueller and Panunzi
(2004). Such arrangements, which rely on second-step mergers between the target and a shell company owned by
the bidder, are not available in all countries. Even in the United States, their role has been diminished due to
the widespread adoption of (anti-)business combination laws.
8Barclay and Holderness (1989), Nenova (2003), and Dyck and Zingales (2004) are empirical studies docu-
menting the value of private benefits of control.
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security benefits. We impose no restriction on the types of financial claims that the bidder can
issue against these security benefits.
The sequence of events is as follows.
In stage 1, the bidder decides whether to bid for the target. If he decides to bid, he can raise
outside funds  in addition to his internal funds and make a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional,
unrestricted cash tender oﬀer with bid price .
In stage 2, the target shareholders simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to
tender their shares. The fraction of tendered shares is denoted by  If   05 the takeover
fails. Conversely, if  ≥ 05 the takeover succeeds, tendering shareholders receive a cash payment
equal to the bid price, and the bidder incurs the execution cost, 
In stage 3, if the bidder gains control of the target, he diverts a fraction (1− ) of its value
as private benefits subject to the constraint  ≥ ¯ imposed by the law.
To select among multiple equilibria, we apply the Pareto-dominance criterion, which selects
the equilibrium outcome with the highest payoﬀ for the target shareholders (e.g., Grossman and
Hart, 1980; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1998; Mueller and Panunzi, 2004). Among other
things, this implies that our focus on value-increasing takeovers is without any loss of generality.
Indeed, any equilibrium of the tendering subgame in which a value-decreasing takeover succeeds
is dominated by an equilibrium in which the takeover fails, where the latter equilibrium always
exists.9 Thus, Pareto dominance rules out what is, by all means, an implausible scenario, namely,
that target shareholders would tender at a bid price below the status quo value.10
The model is solved by backward induction. We first consider the bidder’s diversion deci-
sion followed by the target shareholders’ tendering decision and the bidder’s oﬀer and financing
decisions. In general, a successful bid must win the target shareholders’ approval and match
any competing oﬀer(s). We examine both the case in which shareholder approval is the bind-
ing constraint (“single-bidder case”) and the case in which outbidding of rivals is the binding
constraint (“bidding competition”).
9There is always a Nash equilibrium–in fact, a continuum of Nash equilibria–in which the takeover fails. If it
is anticipated that a majority of the target shareholders does not tender, any individual shareholder is indiﬀerent
between tendering and not tendering, implying that failure can always be supported as an equilibrium outcome.
Note that while unconditional oﬀers may avoid problems of multiple equilibria, they suﬀer from problems of
nonexistence of equilibrium (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988).
10Grossman and Hart (1980, p. 47) also argue that bids below the status quo value are implausible, for exactly
the same reason, namely, because they fail whenever they are expected to fail. Naturally, a value-decreasing
takeover (  0) may succeed if the bidder were to make an oﬀer above the status quo value:   0. However,
making such an oﬀer would violate the bidder’s participation constraint.
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II. Single-Bidder Case
The single-bidder assumption does not literally rule out that other bidders are interested
in the target. It merely presumes that competition is “ineﬀective,” in the sense that no rival
can create nearly as much value as the bidder under consideration. By implication, shareholder
approval is then the binding constraint for a successful takeover.
Consider first stage 3, where the bidder must decide how much value to divert as private
benefits. If the bidder gains control, he chooses  to maximize
 −  () + (1− ) (1)
where  is the value of the security benefits associated with the bidder’s equity stake,  ()
is the value of the outside claims issued against these security benefits, and (1 − ) is the
value of the bidder’s private benefits. Given that the extraction of private benefits involves no
deadweight loss, maximum diversion is always optimal:  = ¯.11 Thus, legal investor protection
imposes a binding constraint on diversion, and the value of the security benefits increases with
the quality of legal investor protection.
Consider next stage 2, where the target shareholders must decide whether to tender their
shares. Being atomistic, target shareholders tender only if the bid price equals or exceeds the
post-takeover value of the security benefits (Bradley, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1980). Thus, a
successful tender oﬀer must satisfy the “free-rider condition”
 ≥ ¯ (2)
If this condition holds with equality, target shareholders are indiﬀerent between tendering and
not tendering. Without loss of generality, we break the indiﬀerence in favor of tendering.12 13
Thus, if the takeover succeeds, it succeeds with  = 1
11Maximum diversion is strictly optimal if either   1 or  ()  ¯ for some   ¯ on a set of positive
measure. In contrast, the bidder is indiﬀerent between diverting and not diverting if both  = 1 and  () ≤ ¯
for all   ¯ i.e., if the value of the outside claims is unaﬀected by his diversion decision.
12See Grossman and Hart (1980, pp. 45-47). A common motivation for this assumption is that the bidder
could always break the indiﬀerence by raising the bid price infinitesimally.
13A small (technical) caveat: We break the indiﬀerence in favor of tendering only if the outcome is such that
the takeover succeeds. Hence, failure can still be supported as an equilibrium outcome.
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Finally, consider stage 1, where the bidder must choose the oﬀer price  and secure financing
for the takeover. A successful oﬀer must satisfy the free-rider condition (2) as well as two further
conditions. First, the oﬀer must satisfy the bidder’s participation constraint. Given that  = 1,
this constraint can be written as
 − −  ≥ 0 (3)
Note that the claims issued to outside investors and the funds provided by them do not appear
in the participation constraint. They cancel out as investors are competitive.
Second, the oﬀer must satisfy the bidder’s budget constraint. Given that  = 1, this con-
straint can be written as
+ ¯ ≥ +  (4)
The left-hand side is the bidder’s total budget. Indeed, the bidder can pledge to outside investors
no more than the value of his security benefits, implying that his outside funding capacity is
limited to ¯. The right-hand side represents the bidder’s need for funds, which includes both
the bid price and the execution cost, .
Lowering the bid price increases the value of the bidder’s objective function–i.e., the left-
hand side of (3)–while relaxing both his budget constraint and his participation constraint.
Therefore, the optimal bid is such that the free-rider condition holds with equality:
 = ¯ (5)
Consequently, the bidder’s budget constraint becomes
 ≥  (6)
while his participation constraint becomes
(1− ) ≥  (7)
Importantly, the bidder’s budget constraint (6) does not depend on the strenght of legal
investor protection. In the original budget constraint (4)–i.e., before inserting the free-rider
condition–the bidder’s outside funding capacity increases with . Indeed, stronger legal in-
vestor protection limits the bidder’s ability to extract private benefits at the expense of other
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investors. This increases his pledgeable income, thereby increasing his outside funding capacity.
However, once the free-rider condition is accounted for, the increased outside funding capacity
does not relax the bidder’s budget constraint, because the bid price–and thus the bidder’s need
for funds–increases in lockstep:  = ¯. Ultimately, the budget constraint is thus independent
of legal investor protection. Also, with all pledgeable value being captured by the target share-
holders, none of this value can be used to raise funds to cover the execution cost, . Accordingly,
that cost must be funded entirely out of the bidder’s internal funds:  ≥ .
The more familiar participation constraint (7) reflects the fact that free-riding by the tar-
get shareholders limits the bidder’s profits to his private benefits net of the execution cost.
Stronger legal investor protection reduces the bidder’s private benefits, thereby tightening his
participation constraint.
Combining (6) and (7), we obtain the following result.
LEMMA 1: The bidder takes over the target if and only if
min{(1− )} ≥  (8)
To summarize, legal investor protection aﬀects the takeover outcome in two ways. On the one
hand, stronger legal investor protection reduces the bidder’s profit, making eﬃcient takeovers
less likely. On the other hand, stronger legal investor protection increases the bidder’s pledgeable
income and therefore his outside funding capacity. The latter eﬀect is immaterial, however, as
the bid price–and thus the bidder’s need for funds–increases in lockstep with his pledgeable
income.
Let us briefly contrast our single-bidder model with the “standard” corporate finance model
of investment (e.g., Tirole, 2006, Chapters 3 and 4). In the standard model, increasing the
entrepreneur’s pledgeable income relaxes his budget constraint and improves eﬃciency. In con-
trast, here, increasing the bidder’s pledgeable income does not relax his constraint, because the
“investment cost” (i.e., the bid price) increases one-for-one with his pledgeable income due to
free-riding by the target shareholders.
We conclude this section by examining the eﬀect of legal investor protection on the likelihood
that eﬃcient takeovers succeed. In condition (8), the left-hand side decreases with  Therefore,
as the quality of legal investor protection improves, it becomes less likely that the bidder acquires
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the target.14
PROPOSITION 1: Absent eﬀective competition for the target, stronger legal investor protection
makes it less likely that eﬃcient takeovers succeed.
Note that, conditional on the takeover succeeding, target shareholders benefit from stronger
legal investor protection through a higher bid price. However, this has no implications for
eﬃciency: It merely constitutes a wealth transfer from the bidder to the target shareholders. In
contrast, the negative eﬀect of legal investor protection on the bidder’s participation constraint
has implications for eﬃciency, as it makes it less likely that eﬃcient takeovers succeed in the
first place.
III. Bidding Competition
As noted earlier, the single-bidder case does not literally rule out that there are multiple
bidders competing for the target. It merely presumes that such competition is “ineﬀective,” in
the sense that the binding constraint is shareholder approval–given by the free-rider condition
(5)–and not outbidding of rivals. By contrast, “eﬀective” bidding competition implies that the
requirement to outbid rivals, rather than winning shareholder approval, determines the winning
bid price.
We consider two potential bidders, bidder 1 and bidder 2, competing to gain control of
the target. Bidder  = 1 2 has internal funds . If bidder  gains control, the target value
increases to   0 where 1  2 without any loss of generality. Regardless of which bidder
gains control, his ability to extract private benefits is limited by the same legal environment, .
(Section V.C examines the case in which bidders come from diﬀerent legal environments.) The
takeover process is the same as in the single-bidder case, except that both bidders make their
oﬀers simultaneously.
In stage 3, as before, the controlling bidder finds it optimal to divert a fraction (1 − ¯) of
the target value as private benefits. In stage 2, the target shareholders can be faced with up to
two oﬀers. The case of a single oﬀer is as before. The case of two oﬀers is as follows.
14Here and elsewhere, we say that an event is more likely if it occurs for a larger set of parameter values.
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LEMMA 2: In a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, the winning bid is the highest bid among those
satisfying  ≥ , if any.
In stage 1, the bidders must decide whether to bid for the target. If so, they make their
oﬀers simultaneously. Denote by b the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make.
That is, b is the highest value of  satisfying the bidder’s participation constraint
 ≥  +  (9)
and his budget constraint
 + ¯ ≥  +  (10)
Accordingly, the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make is
b = ¯ +min©(1− ) ª−  (11)
The first term on the right-hand side represents the security benefits if bidder  gains control.
The bidder is both willing and able to pay for these benefits as he can always pledge their value to
outside investors. The third term is the execution cost, . All else equal, it reduces the bidder’s
willingness to pay for the target. Finally, the second term is the minimum of the bidder’s private
benefits and his internal funds, which increase his willingness and ability, respectively, to pay
for the target.
LEMMA 3: Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
min
©
(1− )1 1ª ≥  (12)
and
1 ≥ min©(1− )2 2ª− (1 − 2) (13)
Lemma 3 lays out two conditions for bidder 1 to win the takeover contest. The first condition,
(12), states that bidder 1 must be willing to incur and able to fund the execution cost. This
condition is the same as in the single-bidder case. It is independent of bidder 2’s presence or
his characteristics. If this condition does not hold, there is either no bidding competition or
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no bidding at all.15 Consequently, to allow for bidding competition, we assume that  is small
enough for condition (12) to hold.
ASSUMPTION 1: min
©
(1− )1 1ª ≥ 
The second condition, (13), arises solely due to bidding competition. It determines under
what conditions bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer, b1 exceeds bidder 2’s maximum oﬀer, b2 As is
shown, bidder 1’s internal funds,  must exceed some minimum threshold. Accordingly, the
right-hand side of (13) captures the extent to which bidding competition tightens bidder 1’s
budget constraint. Importantly, the right-hand side decreases with . Hence, as the quality
of legal investor protection improves, competition has less of a tightening eﬀect on bidder 1’s
budget, making it more likely that he can outbid his less eﬃcient rival, bidder 2.
PROPOSITION 2: Under eﬀective competition for the target, stronger legal investor protection
makes it more likely that eﬃcient takeovers succeed.
When the more eﬃcient bidder is wealthier (1 ≥ 2), condition (13) always holds, i.e.,
irrespective of the quality of legal investor protection. Indeed, bidder 1 not only has a higher
valuation of the target, but he also has a larger budget: He has both more internal funds
(1 ≥ 2) and a higher outside funding capacity (1  2). Thus, while bidder 2’s presence
may very well force bidder 1 to raise his bid, it will never exhaust his budget constraint. By
implication, bidder 1 always wins the takeover contest, and the quality of legal investor protection
is irrelevant for the takeover outcome.
Suppose now that the less eﬃcient bidder is wealthier (1  2). When legal investor
protection is weak, the outcome is now more likely to be ineﬃcient. As an illustration, consider
the extreme case in which investors enjoy no legal protection at all ( = 0). In that case, the two
bidders have no outside funding capacity and must rely entirely on their own funds to finance
their bids. While bidder 1 has a higher valuation of the target, his budget is tighter than bidder
2’s (because 1  2), possibly so tight as to prevent him from making an oﬀer exceeding bidder
2’s. In that case, bidder 2 wins the takeover contest. As the quality of legal investor protection
improves, both bidders can pledge a larger fraction of the firm value to outside investors, which
increases both their budgets. However, because bidder 1 can create more value, his budget
15 If min

(1− )1 1 = (1 − )1   both bidders’ participation constraints are violated as
min

(1− )2 2 ≤ (1− )2  (1− )1 In that case, there is no bidding at all.
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increases more than bidder 2’s, making it more likely that he can outbid his less eﬃcient rival.
Indeed, in the budget constraint (10), the left-hand side increases with  at a rate of  Given
that 1  2 an increase in  therefore increases bidder 1’s budget more than it increases bidder
2’s budget.
Formally, it follows from condition (13) that if 1 ≥ min{2 2} the takeover outcome is
always eﬃcient–i.e., regardless of the quality of legal investor protection. In all other cases,
there exists a critical value 0  0 such that the takeover outcome is eﬃcient if and only if
 ≥ 0
We next examine whether–conditional on the takeover succeeding–target shareholders ben-
efit from stronger legal investor protection. To win the takeover contest, a bidder must not only
outbid his rival(s), but his oﬀer must also satisfy the free-rider condition. Accordingly, the
winning bid is given by ∗ = max
nb  o for  6=  As the losing bidder’s maximum bid, b 
is (weakly) increasing in  this implies that the winning bid is also (weakly) increasing in 
Intuitively, stronger legal investor protection aﬀects the bid price through two channels. First,
it increases the value of the security benefits regardless of the winning bidder’s identity (
increases with ), thus forcing each bidder to raise his bid. Second, it increases both bidders’
outside funding capacity, thus allowing them to compete more fiercly for the target’s shares (b
increases weakly with ) For both reasons, stronger legal investor protection raises the winning
bid price. Consistent with this result, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that takeover premia are
higher in countries with stronger legal investor protection.
Why is the eﬀect of legal investor protection in the competition case diﬀerent from that
in the single-bidder case? After all, in both cases, stronger legal investor protection improves
bidders’ outside funding capacity: Bidder ’s outside funding capacity, , increases with  at
a rate of  (cf., conditions (4) and (10)). However, in the single-bidder case, the bid price,
and hence the bidder’s need for funds, increases in lockstep–i.e., at the same rate–due to the
binding free-rider condition (5). Consequently, the bidder’s budget constraint is not relaxed.
By contrast, in the competition case, the winning bid ∗ is determined by the losing bidder’s
maximum oﬀer b (that is, if competition is “eﬀective”). Accordingly, bidder 1’s outside funding
capacity increases with  at a rate of 1 while his need for funds–in order to make a (winning)
bid equal to bidder 2’s maximum oﬀer–increases only at a rate of 2 (cf., condition (11)).16
16The statement refers to the (relevant) case in which the biddders are financially constrained, so that (1 −
)   in condition (11). By contrast, if (1−) ≤  each bidder can bid up to his full valuation, implying
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This relaxes bidder 1’s budget constraint and makes it more likely that he wins the takeover
contest, which is eﬃcient. The opposite is true for bidder 2. His need for funds increases at a
rate of 1 while his outside funding capacity increases only at a rate of 2 This tightens bidder
2’s budget constraint and makes it less likely that he wins, which is again eﬃcient.
IV. Financing Frictions
One of the contributions of this paper is to introduce financing constraints into a standard
takeover model. Doing so puts the focus on bidders’ budget constraints, with the implication that
they may frustrate eﬃcient takeovers. This section studies financing frictions that may aﬀect
bidders’ budgets and thereby the eﬃciency of the takeover outcome. Section IV.A considers
margin requirements that limit bidders’ outside funding capacity. Section IV.B analyzes shadow
costs of internal funds. Section IV.C explores the role of asset tangibility.
A. Margin Requirements
Margin requirements are common in lending. For instance, when lending cash to investors
for the purpose of buying securities, brokers typically require that investors put up some equity
of their own. Reasons for margin requirements are moral hazard and asymmetric information
on the part of borrowers, which can be mitigated if the borrower puts up some equity of his
own, and the aversion of lenders to possess collateral, which can be mitigated if the asset has an
equity buﬀer that prevents it from going “under water” too quickly. Consistent with investors’
reluctance to lend an amount equal to the full asset value, we assume that they provide funds
only up to (1 − )¯ where ¯ is the pledgeable asset value, as before, and  is the fraction
which the borrower needs to contribute out of his own pocket (“haircut”).
A.1. Single-Bidder Case
The analysis of the single-bidder case is analogous to our basic model, with the exception
that the bidder’s budget constraint is replaced by
+ (1− )¯ ≥ +  (14)
that the quality of legal investor protection is irrelevant.
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Inserting the binding free-rider condition  = ¯ into (14), we obtain
 ≥ ¯ +  (15)
Note that unlike, e.g., firm-level governance, margin requirements aﬀect the bidder’s budget
constraint but not the free-rider condition, as they do not aﬀect the fundamental value of the
target if taken over by the bidder. Consequently, the budget constraint–after inserting the
binding free-rider condition–does not collapse into the familiar constraint  ≥  from Section
II (cf., condition (6)).
In conjunction with the bidder’s participation constraint (7), this implies that we have the
following result.
LEMMA 4: The bidder takes over the target if and only if
min{(1− )− ¯} ≥  (16)
By inspection, stronger legal investor protection impairs eﬃciency, for two reasons. First, like
in our basic single-bidder model, stronger legal investor protection reduces the bidder’s profits,
thereby tightening his participation constraint. Second, and this eﬀect is new, stronger legal
investor protection tightens the bidder’s budget constraint: While it raises his need for funds by
–through the binding free-rider condition  = ¯–it increases his outside funding capacity
only by (1− ). As a consequence, the bidder faces a “funding gap” of ¯, which he must
cover out of his internal funds.
In condition (16), the left-hand side decreases with both  and  Notably, the cross-
derivative with respect to  and  is negative, implying that legal investor protection and
margin requirements are complements: A higher value of one amplifies the negative eﬀect of the
other (that is, on the likelihood that the takeover succeeds).
In sum, when the bidder’s outside funding capacity is impaired by margin requirements,
stronger legal investor protection tightens both his participation constraint and his budget con-
straint. That said, the qualitative implication of Proposition 1, namely, that stronger legal
investor protection makes eﬃcient takeovers less likely, remains valid.
A.2. Bidding Competition
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Again, the main change relative to the basic competition model is that bidder ’s budget
constraint is now
 + (1− )¯ ≥  +  (17)
In conjunction with the participation constraint (9), this implies that the highest oﬀer which
bidder  is willing and able to make is
b = ¯ +min©(1− )  − ¯ª−  (18)
Given Assumption 1, we can again derive conditions under which bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer,b1 exceeds bidder 2’s maximum oﬀer, b2
LEMMA 5: Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
1 ≥ min©(1− )2 2 − ¯2ª+ ¯1 − (1 − 2) (19)
Note that the right-hand side is decreasing in  and increasing in  while the cross-derivative
of the right-hand side with respect to  and  is strictly positive.
PROPOSITION 3: Under eﬀective competition for the target, the takeover outcome is more likely
to be eﬃcient if legal investor protection is strong and margin requirements are low. Furthermore,
the positive eﬀect of legal investor protection is weaker when margin requirements are high, while
the negative eﬀect of margin requirements is stronger when legal investor protection is strong.
Intuitively, the right-hand side in (19) is increasing in  because stronger margin require-
ments hurt bidder 1 relatively more than bidder 2 due to bidder 1’s larger outside funding
capacity. As for the cross-derivative, recall that stronger legal investor protection increases
bidder 1’s outside funding capacity more than bidder 2’s. This can be easily seen from (17),
where the diﬀerence ∆ = (1 − )¯(1 − 2) is increasing in ¯ That said, the rate of increase,
∆
¯  0 is decreasing in , meaning the positive eﬀect of legal investor protection–namely, to
increase bidder 1’s relative outside funding capacity–is weaker when margin requirements are
high. Likewise, we have that ∆  0 is lower when ¯ is high. While an increase in margin
requirements always hurts bidder 1 relatively more, it hurts him (relatively) the most when the
diﬀerence between his and bidder 2’s outside funding capacity is largest, i.e., when legal investor
protection is strong.
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Finally, the winning bid, ∗ = max
nb  o for  6=  is (weakly) decreasing in  Hence,
our model predicts that takeover premia are lower when margin requirements are high.
B. Shadow Costs of Internal Funds
Thus far we have assumed that bidders’ internal funds are excess cash or liquid funds.
However, in a world with financing frictions, firms will likely hold internal funds for a reason, e.g.,
to smooth out operational risks or fund investment projects that otherwise cannot be funded.
This, however, implies that internal funds ought to have a positive shadow value. Accordingly,
we assume that using  ≤  units of internal funds entails a shadow cost of  representing,
e.g., the forgone returns from alternative investment projects or the costs of liquidating less-
than-fully-liquid assets.
B.1. Single-Bidder Case
The analysis is analogous to our basic single-bidder model, except that the bidder’s partici-
pation constraint is now
 − − −  ≥ 0 (20)
Hence, using  units of internal funds lowers the bidder’s payoﬀ by . In contrast, the bidder’s
budget constraint depends only on his available internal funds, , not on the amount actually
used. Consequently, it is still given by (4) or–after inserting the binding free-rider condition–by
(6).
Inserting the binding free-rider condition into (20) yields
(1− ) −  ≥  (21)
Since using internal funds involves a shadow cost, the bidder will first exhaust his outside funding
capacity. Hence, the amount of internal funds drawn on is  = + − or–after inserting the
binding free-rider condition– = . As a result, the bidder’s participation constraint becomes
(1− ) ≥ (1 + ) (22)
As one might expect, an increase in the shadow costs of internal funds,   tightens the bidder’s
participation constraint.
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In conjunction with the bidder’s budget constraint (6), this yields the following result.
LEMMA 6: The bidder takes over the target if and only if
min
½
(1− )
1 +  
¾
≥  (23)
As in our basic single-bidder model, legal investor protection has no eﬀect on the bidder’s
budget constraint. However, it tightens his participation constraint, making eﬃcient takeovers
less likely.
Of particular interest is that the cross-derivative of the left-hand side in (23) with respect
to  and  is positive. This has two implications. First, it implies that the negative eﬀect of
legal investor protection on eﬃciency is weaker when  is high. Intuitively, while legal investor
protection reduces the bidder’s private benefits, it also improves his outside funding capacity,
thereby reducing his need for internal funds, which in turn is more valuable when internal funds
command a high shadow value. Second, it implies that the negative eﬀect of shadow costs
of internal funds is weaker when legal investor protection is strong. Intuitively, stronger legal
investor protection means that the bidder needs to use less internal funds, meaning a given
increase in  involves a smaller reduction in his payoﬀ.
B.2. Bidding Competition
Analogous to the single-bidder case, the main change relative to our basic competition model
is that bidder ’s participation constraint is now
 −  − −  ≥ 0 (24)
Given that bidder  fully exhausts his outside funding capacity before tapping into internal
funds, the amount of internal funds drawn on is  = + − Hence, bidder ’s participation
constraint becomes
 + (1− )
1 +  −  −  ≥ 0 (25)
In conjunction with his budget constraint (10), this implies that the highest oﬀer which bidder
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 is willing and able to make is
b = ¯ +min½(1− )
1 +  
¾
−  (26)
Again, we can determine the conditions under which bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer, b1 exceeds
bidder 2’s maximum oﬀer, b2
LEMMA 7: Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
1 ≥ min
½
(1− )2
1 +  2
¾
− (1 − 2) (27)
Note that the right-hand side is decreasing in  and   while the cross-derivative with respect
to  and  is strictly positive.
PROPOSITION 4: Under eﬀective competition for the target, the takeover outcome is more
likely to be eﬃcient if legal investor protection is strong and the shadow costs of internal funds
are high. Furthermore, the positive eﬀect of legal investor protection is weaker when internal
funds command a high shadow cost, while the positive eﬀect of shadow costs of internal internal
funds is weaker when legal investor protection is strong.
In our analysis, the main ineﬃciency in takeovers is that less eﬃcient but wealthy bidders
may win the contest because i) limited pledgeability constrains bidders’ outside funding capacity,
and ii) their internal funds may allow them to overcome this “funding gap” and outbid more
eﬃcient but less wealthy rivals. Consequently, any financing friction making it more diﬃcult
or costly for bidders to raise outside funds–such as the margin requirements analyzed in the
previous section–must reduce eﬃciency. Conversely, any financing friction making it more
diﬃcult, or costly, for bidders to draw on their internal funds must improve the eﬃciency of the
takeover outcome.
In this light, it becomes clear why high shadow costs of internal funds must improve eﬃciency:
They make it less likely that wealthy but ineﬃcient bidders find it profitable to use their internal
funds to outbid less wealthy but more eﬃcient rivals. Intuitively, this positive eﬀect is more
pronounced when legal investor protection is weak, because this is precisely when internal funds
matter the most and the associated ineﬃciency is greatest. It is also intuitive why the positive
eﬀect of legal investor protection is weaker when internal funds command a high shadow value:
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If internal funds are expensive, then ineﬃcient but wealthy bidders are less likely to win in the
first place, and institutions improving the relative outside funding capacity of more eﬃcient
bidders, such as legal investor protection, are relatively less important.
Finally, the winning bid, ∗ = max
nb  o for  6=  is (weakly) decreasing in   Thus, while
high shadow costs of internal funds are good for eﬃciency, they are bad for target shareholders
as they imply a lower bid premium.
C. Asset Tangibility
Some assets are more tangible than others, more diﬃcult to divert, and their cash flows
are more readily verifiable. In a world with financing frictions, such assets are highly desir-
able, as they command a higher outside funding capacity. From an empirical perspective, the
implications of asset tangibility for financing constraints are an important topic (e.g., Almeida
and Campello, 2007). That being said, the economic forces through which asset tangibility and
legal investor protection aﬀect the takeover outcome are similar. Accordingly, we shall confine
ourselves here to a brief verbal description of the results. The full analysis is provided in the
Internet Appendix.
To explore the eﬀects of asset tangibility, we assume that a fraction  of the target value
cannot be expropriated–irrespective of the quality of legal investor protection.17 In the single-
bidder case, an increase in asset tangibility tightens the bidder’s participation constraint but
has no eﬀect on his budget constraint. Thus, akin to the role of legal investor protection, an
increase in asset tangibility makes it less likely that eﬃcient takeovers succeed. By contrast,
in the competition model, stronger legal investor protection and high asset tangibility both
improve the eﬃciency of the takeover outcome. Importantly, the two are substitutes, meaning
the positive eﬀect of asset tangibility is weaker when legal investor protection is strong, and vice
versa. Lastly, the model predicts that takeover premia are higher when asset tangibility is high.
V. Miscellaneous Extensions
Taking into account the interaction between legal investor protection and financing con-
straints also provides new insights into the optimal allocation of voting rights, the sale of con-
trolling blocks, and the role of legal investor protection for cross-border M&A. For brevity, we
17Almeida and Campello (2007) argue that asset tangibility is “a proxy for pledgeability” (p. 1430).
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focus on the competition model, noting that the single-bidder model is straightforward to solve.
Given that the execution cost matters only in the single-bidder model, we set  = 0 for simplicity.
A. “One Share—One Vote”
This section studies the implications of departures from “one share—one vote.” Suppose the
target has a dual-class share system: A fraction  ∈ (0 1] of the shares have (equal) voting rights,
while the remaining shares are non-voting. A “one share—one vote” structure corresponds to
 = 1.
In stage 3, as before, the controlling bidder finds it optimal to divert a fraction (1− ¯) of the
target value as private benefits. In stage 2, target shareholders of diﬀerent voting classes may
face diﬀerent bids, which they each must accept or reject. That is, we explicitly allow bidders
to make diﬀerent bids for voting and non-voting shares. As it turns out, this problem can be
simplified.
LEMMA 8: Without loss of generality, we may assume that bidders make a bid only for voting
shares.
From the bidder’s perspective, it is immaterial whether or not he acquires non-voting shares:
They do not help him to gain control. Thus, the most he is willing to pay for these shares is
their “fundamental” value, 18 In contrast, as was shown in Section III, bidders may pay a
higher price for the voting shares to gain control of the target. Moreover, due to free-riding,
non-voting shareholders will tender only if the bid price is at least  Accordingly, the only
bid price at which a transaction may occur is . At this price, however, both parties (bidder
and non-voting shareholders) are indiﬀerent between trading and not trading. Thus, without
any loss of generality, we may assume that bidders do not make a bid for non-voting shares.
The tendering decision is the same as in our basic model. Hence, by Lemma 2, voting
shareholders tender to the highest bidder oﬀering  ≥ , if any. In stage 1, the bidders must
decide whether to bid for the target. Thus, we must again characterize the highest oﬀer which
bidder  is willing and able to make, b() i.e., the highest value of  satisfying the bidder’s
participation constraint
¯ + (1− ) ≥  (28)
18As is customary in the literature, we express bids in terms of a measure one of shares. Given that a fraction
(1−) of the shares are non-voting, this means the bidder is willing to pay up to (1−) for all of the non-voting
shares.
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and his budget constraint
 + ¯ ≥  (29)
In the participation constraint (28), ¯ is the value of the security benefits associated with
the voting shares, (1− ) are the bidder’s private benefits, and  is the total payout to the
voting shareholders. In the budget constraint (29), the left-hand side represents the bidder’s
total budget, consisting of his internal funds,  and his outside funding capacity, ¯ while
the right-hand side reflects his need for funds.
Accordingly, the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make is
b = ¯ + 1 ·min©(1− ) ª  (30)
This expression resembles (11), except that  = 0 and that the second term is normalized by the
fraction of voting shares,  Indeed, when not all shares carry a vote, the bidder’s willingness and
ability to pay, respectively, is spread across fewer shares. This increases the maximum oﬀer he is
willing and able to make (for the voting shares). In particular, the bidder’s willingness to pay is
higher, because he can now obtain the same private benefits by acquiring fewer shares. Likewise,
his ability to pay is higher, because he can now use his private wealth for the acquisition of fewer
shares.19
LEMMA 9: Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
1 ≥ min©(1− )2 2ª− (1 − 2) (31)
By inspection, the right-hand side decreases with . Thus, the likelihood that bidder 1 wins
the takeover contest is highest under a “one share—one vote” structure.20
PROPOSITION 5: “One share—one vote” is socially optimal.
When the more eﬃcient bidder is also wealthier (1 ≥ 2), condition (31) holds for any
value of  That is, the takeover outcome is always eﬃcient–irrespective of the fraction of
19Deviations from “one share—one vote” are equivalent to allowing for restricted bids where the biddders
compete for a fraction  ≥ 05 of the shares and the winner is the bidder with the highest bid.
20 In contrast, the security-voting structure (i.e., the value of ) is irrelevant in the single-bidder case, because
the bid price must equal the post-takeover value of the security benefits.
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voting shares. The intuition is the same as in our basic model: Not only does bidder 1 have
a higher valuation of the target, but he also has a larger budget. Hence, bidder 1 can always
outbid his less eﬃcient rival, bidder 2
Suppose now instead that the less eﬃcient bidder is wealthier (1  2). If 1 is suﬃciently
large, the takeover outcome is again eﬃcient regardless of the fraction of voting shares. This
situation–i.e., when both bidders are financially unconstrained–is the situation analyzed in
much of the theory of takeovers.
However, if 1 is suﬃciently small, the takeover outcome may be ineﬃcient. Indeed, while
bidder 1 has a higher willingness to pay for the target, bidder 2’s ability to pay may be higher
due to his larger wealth. As an illustration, consider the (relevant) case where the bidders face
binding financing constraints,  ≤ (1− ) By (30), this implies that the highest oﬀer which
bidder  is willing and able to make is
b = ¯ +   (32)
Hence, even though bidder 2 generates lower security benefits (¯2  ¯1), his maximum oﬀer
may be higher than bidder 1’s if 2 is suﬃciently larger than 1 Moreover, when  is small, a
smaller wealth diﬀerence, 2−1 is needed for bidder 2 to be able to outbid bidder 1. Intuitively,
the eﬀect of bidder wealth on the takeover outcome is larger when  is small, because a given
wealth can be spread across fewer voting shares.
More formally, it follows from condition (31) that if 1 ≥ min©(1− )2 2ª  the takeover
outcome is eﬃcient for any value of  i.e., irrespective of the fraction of voting shares. By
contrast, if 1  min©(1− )2 2ª − (1 − 2) the takeover outcome is ineﬃcient for any
value of  In all intermediate cases, there exists a critical value
b = min©(1− )2 2ª−1(1 − 2)  (33)
such that the takeover outcome is eﬃcient if and only if  ≥ b By inspection, b decreases with
¯ Hence, departures from “one share—one vote” are more likely to lead to an ineﬃcient takeover
outcome when legal investor protection is weak. (Conversely, weak legal investor protection is
more likely to lead to an ineﬃcient takeover outcome when the fraction of voting shares, , is
small.)
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COROLLARY 1: Deviations from “one share—one vote” are more likely to lead to an ineﬃcient
takeover outcome when legal investor protection is weak.
Our result must be contrasted with that in Grossman and Hart (1988, GH) and Harris and
Raviv (1988, HR), who also find that “one share—one vote” is socially optimal. The economics
behind their result, however, is fundamentally diﬀerent. In GH and HR, departures from “one
share—one vote” may allow bidders with low security benefits but high private benefits to win
against bidders with high security benefits but low private benefits, even if the former are less
eﬃcient–i.e., even if they generate lower total benefits. In our model, this is not possible, as
security and private benefits are positively aligned. That is, our model assumes that bidders
can divert more value in absolute (i.e., dollar) terms from more valuable firms. In contrast, in
both GH and HR, bidders can divert more value in absolute terms from less valuable firms.
The converse is also true: The main ineﬃciency in our model–which is minimized under a
“one share—one vote” structure–does not arise in GH and HR. Recall that the main ineﬃciency
in our model is not that less eﬃcient bidders may have a higher willingness to pay, as in GH and
HR, but rather that they may have a higher ability to pay. Hence, the sole reason why eﬃcient
takeovers may not materialize in our model is because bidders are financially constrained. In
contrast, in both GH and HR, bidders are arbitrarily wealthy, so financing constraints play no
role.
B. Sales of Controlling Blocks
We next consider the case in which the target has a controlling shareholder (“incumbent”).
The incumbent owns a fraction  ≥ 05 of the target shares and generates firm value 0 ≥ 0
which is divided into security benefits 0 and private benefits (1 − )0. The target faces a
(single) potential acquirer (“bidder”). If the bidder gains control of the target, its value increases
to 1  0.
A transfer of control must be mutually beneficial, given that the incumbent can always block
the transfer at will. Accordingly, a control transfer may only occur if the bidder is willing and
able to compensate the incumbent for his controlling block. Consistent with the law and legal
practice in the United States, we assume that minority shareholders enjoy no rights in this
sale-of-control transaction. In particular, the bidder is under no obligation to extend his oﬀer
to minority shareholders. In fact, he is under no obligation to make them any oﬀer at all. This
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rule, known as “market rule” (MR), is the prevailing rule in the United States. Given that it
imposes no obligation on the acquirer, “the MR is probably best described as the absence of a
rule, rather than a rule” (Schuster, 2013, p. 535).
Many other countries, including most European countries, use the “equal opportunity rule”
(EOR)–also known as “mandatory bid rule” (MBR)–which requires that the bidder makes an
oﬀer to the minority shareholders on the same terms as his oﬀer to the controlling blockholder.
At the end of this section, we oﬀer a brief verbal discussion of what would change if the bidder
were subject to the EOR/MBR. A formal analysis is provided in the Internet Appendix.
In stage 3, as before, the bidder diverts a fraction (1 − ¯) of the target value as private
benefits. In stage 2, the incumbent and the minority shareholders may face diﬀerent bids, which
they each must accept or reject. Note the analogy to Section V.A. There, we assumed without
loss of generality that bidders do not make a bid for non-voting shares. Likewise, here, the bidder
has nothing to gain from acquiring minority shares: They do not help him to gain control, and
the only price at which a transaction may occur is at their “fundamental” value, 1 making
everybody indiﬀerent between trading and not trading. Analogous to Lemma 8, we can thus
assume without loss of generality that the bidder does not make a bid for the minority shares.
We must again characterize the highest oﬀer which the bidder is willing and able to make,b1() i.e., the highest value of 1 satisfying his participation constraint
¯1 + (1− )1 ≥ 1 (34)
and his budget constraint
1 + ¯1 ≥ 1 (35)
Conditions (34) and (35) are similar to (28) and (29), except that  is replaced with 
Accordingly, the highest oﬀer which the bidder is willing and able to make is
b1 = ¯1 + 1 ·min©(1− )1 1ª  (36)
while the incumbent’s valuation of the controlling block is
0 = 0 + (1− )0 (37)
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For a sale-of-control transaction to occur, the bidder’s maximum oﬀer for the controlling block,
b1 must equal or exceed the incumbent’s valuation of the same, 0.21 Otherwise, there are
no gains from trade.22
LEMMA 10: The bidder gains control of the target and only if
1 ≥ (1− )0 − (1 − 0) (38)
Condition (38) is similar to condition (31). The latter condition reflects the requirement
that bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer for the block of voting shares, b1 must exceed bidder 2’s
maximum oﬀer, b2 Likewise, condition (38) states that the bidder’s maximum oﬀer for the
controlling block, b1 must exceed the incumbent’s valuation, 0 The main diﬀerence is that
the incumbent’s wealth does not enter in condition (38). As the incumbent already owns the
controlling block, his ability to pay is irrelevant. In a sense, the incumbent is like a rival bidder
who is arbitrarily wealthy.
By inspection, the right-hand side of (38) decreases with . Thus, the likelihood that the
sale of control takes place increases with the size of the controlling block.
PROPOSITION 6: Eﬃcient sales of control are more likely to succeed when the controlling block
is large (as a fraction of the total equity value).
Recall that the incumbent’s wealth plays no role: He can always “aﬀord” the controlling
block by simply refusing to sell it. Accordingly, whether or not the sale of control takes place
depends solely on the bidder’s wealth. If 1 is suﬃciently large, the sale of control always takes
place–irrespective of the size of the controlling block. Thus, absent financial constraints, the
takeover outcome is always eﬃcient.
In contrast, if the bidder is financially constrained, the sale of control may not take place.
Precisely, for the sale of control to succeed, the bidder must compensate the incumbent for his
security benefits, 0 and his private benefits, (1 − )0 To do so, the bidder can use his
internal funds, 1 and his outside funds, ¯1 Clearly, if 1 ≥ (1 − )0 the sale of control
21Recall that we express bids in terms of a measure one of shares. Thus, if the highest oﬀer which the bidder
is willing and able to make is 1 his maximum oﬀer for the controlling block is 1
22The sale will occur at some price  ∈ [0 1] depending on the incumbent’s and bidder’s relative bargaining
powers. For our purposes, the value of  is not important, as it does not aﬀect eﬃciency.
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always takes place. In contrast, if 1  (1 − )0 the bidder is unable to pay in full for
the incumbent’s private benefits out of his internal funds and must consequently tap his outside
funds, ¯1 However, since the bidder must also pay for the incumbent’s security benefits, 0
his “disposable” outside funds are only (1 − 0) If this is suﬃcient to cover the “funding
gap” of (1− )0 − 1 the sale of control will take place. Otherwise, it will fail. Importantly,
the bidder’s “disposable” outside funds are increasing in  which explains Proposition 6.
Formally, it follows from condition (38) that if 1 ≥ (1 − )0 − 2 (1 − 0) the sale of
control always takes place–irrespective of the size of the controlling block. By contrast, if
1  (1−)0−(1−0) the sale of control never takes place. In all intermediate cases, there
exists a critical value b ≥ 05 given by
b = (1− )0 −1(1 − 0)  (39)
such that the sale of control takes place if and only if  ≥ b By inspection, b decreases with ¯
Thus, eﬃcient sales of control are more likely to occur when legal investor protection is strong.
COROLLARY 2: Stronger legal investor protection makes it more likely that eﬃcient sales of
control succeed.
Bebchuk (1994) also finds that eﬃcient sales of control may not take place, albeit for a
diﬀerent reason. In his model, an incumbent with low security benefits but high private benefits
may not sell his controlling block to a potential acquirer with high security benefits but low
private benefits, even if the sale of control is eﬃcient. In our model, this possibility cannot arise,
as security and private benefits are positively aligned. Instead, eﬃcient sales of control may
fail in our model because bidders are financially constrained. In contrast, in Bebchuk’s model,
bidders are arbitrarily wealthy, so financing constraints play no role.
Thus far, we have (implicitly) assumed that the bidder makes an oﬀer for the entire control-
ling block. We should point out that none of our results depend on this assumption. Given that
the likelihood of an eﬃcient sale of control depends on the size of the controlling block, this may
at first glance seem surprising. However, it is easy to show that condition (38)–which is the
central condition characterizing when the bidder gains control of the target–remains unchanged
if we allow him to make a (restricted) oﬀer for only a fraction of the controlling block.
To see this, suppose the bidder makes a bid 1 for a fraction   1 of the controlling
30
block, where  ≥ 05 ensures that he acquires enough shares to gain control. We must again
characterize the highest value of 1 satisfying the bidder’s participation constraint
¯1 + (1− )1 ≥ 1 (40)
and his budget constraint
1 + ¯1 ≥ 1 (41)
Hence, the highest oﬀer which the bidder is willing and able to make is
b1 = ¯1 + 1 ·min©(1− )1 1ª  (42)
Comparing (42) with (36) illustrates that allowing the bidder to make a restricted bid raises
his maximum oﬀer: b1  b1 Intuitively, the bidder is both willing and able to pay a higher
price as he can spread his private benefits and wealth, respectively, over fewer shares. However,
this oﬀer is now only for a fraction  of the incumbent’s shares. The remaining fraction, 1− 
is valued at the post-takeover share value ¯1  b1 with the eﬀect that the incumbent’s total
payoﬀ remains excactly the same as before:
b1 + (1− )¯1 = b1 (43)
Intuitively, the incumbent’s total payoﬀ–i.e., the left-hand side in (43)–can be decomposed
into two parts: The security benefits associated with his controlling block, ¯1 and the control
premium paid by the bidder. The security benefits are evidently independent of  But so is
the control premium. By (42), the control premium is equal to  × 1 ·min
©
(1− )1 1ª 
which depends only on the bidder’s private benefits, (1− )1 and his wealth, 123
Having established that the incumbent’s payoﬀ is independent of how many shares he sells–
as long as enough are sold to allow the bidder to gain control–the rest of the argument is
straightforward. In particular, as the incumbent’s payoﬀ remains unchanged, the central con-
dition in Lemma 10 describing when the sale of control succeeds, (38), is also unchanged.24
23Recall that bids are expressed in terms of a measure one of shares. Thus, to obtain the control premium (in
dollars), one must multiply 1 ·min

(1− )1 1 in (42) with the size of the block that is being traded, 
24Precisely, the sale of control takes place if and only if
1 + (1− )¯1 ≥ 0 + (1− )0
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Naturally, this implies that all results building on Lemma 10, such as Proposition 6 and Corol-
lary 2, also remain unchanged.
Returning to our main analysis, we now endogenize the size of the incumbent’s controlling
block. Suppose the incumbent is initially the firm’s sole owner. In the spirit of Zingales (1995),
he can retain a controlling block,  ≥ 05 and sell the remaining shares, 1 −  to dispersed
investors. At some future date, the firm is approached by a potential bidder, as described
above, and a control transfer may take place. As in Zingales’ analysis, everybody has rational
expectations about this future control transfer. For simplicity, we assume that the bidder has
full bargaining power vis-à-vis the incumbent, though all of our qualitative results remain valid
as long as he has some bargaining power.
We know that the control transfer succeeds if and only if condition (38) holds. In that
case, given that the bidder has full bargaining power, he acquires the controlling block at a
price equal to the incumbent’s valuation, (37). Moreover, when the incumbent sells shares to
dispersed investors, they rationally anticipate the control transfer and are thus willing to pay
up to (1− )1 for the minority stake. Overall, and as long as condition (38) holds, the
incumbent’s total payoﬀ at the initial stage is therefore
0 + (1− )0 + (1− )1 (44)
Given that 1  0 the incumbent’s total payoﬀ decreases with . On the other hand, condition
(38) becomes tighter as  decreases. Consequently, the incumbent chooses the smallest value of
 ≥ 05 that is compatible with condition (38).
PROPOSITION 7: The incumbent’s optimal controlling block is
∗ = max
½
(1− )0 −1
(1 − 0)  05
¾
 (45)
Zingales (1995) also models the incumbent’s choice of controlling block in anticipation of a
future control transfer, and he also assumes that the bidder is more eﬃcient than the incumbent.
However, Zingales assumes that the bidder is arbitrarily wealthy. In our model, if the bidder
were suﬃciently wealthy, the optimal controlling block would always be ∗ = 05 In contrast,
if the bidder is financially constrained–precisely, if 1  (1 − )0 − 2 (1 − 0)–the optimal
Inserting 1 from (42) and going through the same steps as in the Proof of Lemma 3 yields (38).
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controlling block is ∗  05 By inspection, ∗ decreases with 
COROLLARY 3: The optimal controlling block is larger when legal investor protection is weak.
This result is consistent with evidence by, e.g., La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), who find that
ownership is more concentrated in countries with weaker legal investor protection.
Let us conclude with a brief discussion of how our results might change if–instead of being
subject to the MR–the bidder were subject to the EOR/MBR. A formal analysis is provided
in the Internet Appendix.
Under the EOR/MBR, the bidder is obliged to make an oﬀer to minority shareholders
on the same terms as his oﬀer to the incumbent. Accordingly, if the bidder pays a control
premium to the incumbent, he must pay the same control premium also to minority shareholders.
This has two eﬀects, both of which make eﬃcient sale-of-control transactions less likely. First,
paying a control premium to minority shareholders reduces the bidder’s profits and tightens his
participation constraint. This eﬀect–namely, that the EOR/MBR redistributes takeover gains
from the bidder to minority shareholders–is well known (e.g., Kahan, 1993; Bebchuk, 1994).
Second, and this eﬀect is unique to our framework, any premium above the (pledgeable) security
benefits must be financed out of the bidder’s internal funds. Thus, if the bidder is forced to pay
a control premium also to minority shareholders, this tightens his budget constraint.
Besides the fact that eﬃcient sale-of-control transactions are less likely to succeed, however,
nothing changes. In particular, as is shown in the Internet Appendix, all qualitative results from
this section–i.e., Proposition 6, Corollary 2, and Corollary 3–continue to hold if the bidder
were instead subject to the EOR/MBR.
C. Cross-Border M&A
This section extends our analysis to the case in which bidders come from diﬀerent legal
environments. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1  2. That is, bidder 1 comes
from an environment with stronger legal investor protection than bidder 2. To isolate the eﬀect
of legal investor protection on the takeover outcome, we assume that both bidders have the same
internal funds,  and can create the same value, 
In a typical cross-border M&A transaction, the target adopts the corporate governance
structures, accounting standards, and disclosure practices of the country of the acquirer (Rossi
and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2009). Hence, if bidder 
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wins the takeover contest, his private benefits are (1−) while the security benefits accruing to
all shareholders, including the bidder himself, are  Note that, unlike in our previous analysis,
private and security benefits are now inversely related: While bidder 1 generates higher security
benefits, his private benefits are lower than bidder 2’s. Also, note that both bidders now generate
the same total (i.e., security plus private) benefits. From an eﬃciency standpoint, it is therefore
immaterial who wins the takeover contest. Thus, the question here is not whether eﬃcient
takeovers take place, but rather under what conditions bidders from environments with stronger
legal investor protection can outbid their rivals from environments with weaker legal investor
protection.
In principle, minority shareholder protection at the target firm may become worse if the
acquirer comes from an environment with weaker legal investor protection.25 Empirically, this
case seems less relevant, however. In the vast majority of cross-border M&A deals, the acquirer
comes from a country with stronger, not weaker, legal investor protection (Rossi and Volpin,
2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2009; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012),
implying that “[o]n average, shareholder protection increases in the target company via the
cross-border deal” (Rossi and Volpin, 2004, p. 291). To avoid this issue altogether, we assume
that legal investor protection in the target’s home country, 0, is less than or equal to 2 In
the special case where 0 = 2 our model thus analyzes competition between a domestic bidder
(bidder 2) and a foreign bidder (bidder 1). In all other cases, it analyzes competition between
two foreign bidders.
The analysis is analogous to that in Section III, except that  is bidder-specific, while both
 and  are identical across bidders. Accordingly, bidder ’s maximum oﬀer is
b = ¯ +min©(1− )ª  (46)
PROPOSITION 8: If   (1 − 2) the bidder from the country with stronger legal investor
protection wins the takeover contest. Otherwise, either of the two bidders may win the takeover
contest.
As both bidders create the same value, they have the same willingness to pay. Hence, the
25“The target almost always adopts the governance standards of the acquirers, whether good or bad” (Rossi
and Volpin, 2004, p. 300, italics added). Likewise, “the new law can be less protective than before, a type of legal
reform that is unheard of in the literature” (Bris and Cabolis, 2008, p. 606).
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takeover outcome depends solely on their ability to pay. There are three cases.
If  ≥ (1 − 2), neither bidder is financially constrained. As a result, both bidders can
make a bid up to their full valuation of the target,  which implies either bidder may win the
takeover contest.
The second case, (1−2)   ≥ (1−1) illustrates perhaps best the strategic role of legal
investor protection in takeover contests. While both bidders create the same value,  bidder
1 generates more security benefits. Bidder 1 has therefore a higher outside funding capacity,
allowing him to make a bid up to his full valuation, b1 =  In contrast, bidder 2 can only make
a bid up to b2 = 2 +   As a result, bidder 1 wins the takeover contest.
The third case,   (1−1) is similar to the second, except that bidder 1 can no longer make
a bid up to his full valuation. Consequently, both bidders can now only bid up to b = +
However, as bidder 1 generates more security benefits, he can still outbid his rival, bidder 2.
We may again ask whether–conditional on the takeover succeeding–target shareholders
benefit from stronger legal investor protection. In the first case, the winning bid is independent
of  In the second and third case, the winning bid is ∗1 = max{b2 1}, which is (weakly)
increasing in the quality of legal investor protection in the acquirer’s country, 1 Consistent with
this result, Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that takeover premia in cross-border M&A deals are
higher when legal investor protection in the acquirer’s country is stronger than in the target’s.
Likewise, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that takeover premia are higher in cross-border M&A
deals compared to domestic M&A deals, while the acquirer in a typical cross-border M&A deal
is usually from a country with stronger legal investor protection.
VI. Firm-Level Governance
So far, we have focused on the legal environment as the main source of investor protection.
However, firms can often improve on this minimum level. For instance, boards of directors or
audit committees may curb controlling shareholders’ self-serving behavior. In what follows, we
assume that potential bidders, by way of setting up such institutions, can credibly limit their
private benefits extraction, thus eﬀectively converting private benefits into pledgeable security
benefits. However, doing so is costly. Monitors, such as auditors and independent directors,
require compensation for their activities. Such compensation is (realistically) paid out of the
firm’s own pocket. Accordingly, we assume that converting  units of private benefits into
35
security benefits reduces firm value by , where 0    1. Security benefits are thus given
by ( − ) +  while private benefits amount to (1− )( − )−  Starting from the level
of private benefits associated with the level of legal investor protection, (1 − ) this implies
that the maximum amount of private benefits that can be converted is  ≤ (1− )( − ) or,
equivalently,  ≤ (1−)
1+(1−) 
A. Single-Bidder Case
Stages 2 and 3 are analogous to our basic model. In particular, in stage 3, we have maximum
dispersion,  = ¯, while in stage 2 a successful tender oﬀer must satisfy the free-rider condition
 ≥ ( − ) +  (47)
Next, consider stage 1, where the bidder must choose the oﬀer price  In addition to satisfying
the free-rider condition (47), a successful tender oﬀer must also satisfy the bidder’s participation
constraint
 − − −  ≥ 0 (48)
and his budget constraint
+ ( − ) +  ≥ +  (49)
As usual, the optimal bid in the single-bidder case is such that the free-rider condition (47)
holds with equality. Hence, the bidder’s budget constraint becomes
 ≥  (50)
and his participation constraints becomes
(1− )( − )−  ≥  (51)
The budget constraint (50) is identical to that in our basic model and is independent of legal
investor protection but also of firm-level governance. Intuitively, once the free-rider condition
is accounted for, the additional outside funding capacity due to firm-level governance does not
relax the bidder’s budget constraint, as the bid price–and thus the bidder’s need for funds–
increases in lockstep:  = (−)+ Consequently, the only eﬀect of firm-level governance is
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that it reduces the bidder’s private benefits, thus tightening his participation constraint. Unlike
in the basic model, however, this is now for two reasons. For one, there is the direct, marginal
reduction in private benefits of . In addition, however, there is also the inframarginal reduction
of (1−) arising from the fact that the cost of firm-level governance is paid out of the firm’s
pocket.
Given that firm-level governance has no benefits, but only costs, the bidder optimally sets
∗ = 0 As a result, the remaining analysis of the single-bidder case is isomorphic to our basic
single-bidder model.
B. Bidding Competition
Firm-level governance does matter under eﬀective competition among bidders. Stages 2 and
3 are analogous to our basic competition model, except that the free-rider condition in Lemma
2 is replaced by the requirement that  ≥ ( − ) + 
Consider next stage 1, and denote by b the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able
to make. That is, b is the highest value of  satisfying the bidder’s participation constraint
 −  −  −  ≥ 0 (52)
and his budget constraint
¯( − ) +  + ≥  +  (53)
Hence, converting private benefits into security benefits (  0) relaxes the bidder’s budget
constraint but tightens his participation constraint.
Given (52) and (53), the highest oﬀer which bidder  is willing and able to make is
b = ¯ +min©(1− ) −   + (1− )ª−  (54)
The first term in brackets is decreasing in  while the second term is increasing in  Accord-
ingly, if the binding constraint is the bidder’s participation constraint (i.e., (1− )  ), his
maximum oﬀer is given by b = −−  which implies he optimally sets ∗ = 0 In contrast,
if the binding constraint is the bidder’s budget constraint (i.e., (1 − ) ≥ ), his maximum
oﬀer is given by b = ¯++ (1−)−  As this expression is increasing in  the bidder
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optimally raises  until the second term in brackets equals the first.26 Formally, this implies
that ∗ is given by
(1− ) − ∗ =  + ∗ (1− )
LEMMA 11: Bidder i ’s optimal choice of firm-level governance is given by
∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if (1− )  
(1−)−
1+(1−) if (1− ) ≥ 
 (55)
Some comparative statics are of interest. Specifically, we have from (55) that 
∗ ≤ 0
∗ ≤ 0 
∗
 ≤ 0 and
∗ ≥ 0 Moreover, the case where (1 − ) ≥  becomes more likely
when  and  are small and when  is large.
COROLLARY 4: Bidder i ’s optimal choice of firm-level governance is decreasing in the cost of
governance, the bidder’s wealth, and the strenght of legal investor protection, and is increasing
in the (gross) firm value created by the bidder.
That ∗ is decreasing in the cost of governance is intuitive. Also intuitive is that it is
decreasing in the bidder’s wealth. After all, the only purpose of firm-level governance in our
model is that it relaxes the bidder’s budget constraint. Indeed, if the bidder is suﬃciently
wealthy (  (1 − )), his optimal choice of firm-level governance is ∗ = 0. Likewise, it is
intuitive that ∗ is decreasing in the strenght of legal investor protection. Indeed, legal investor
protection and firm-level governance serve the same purpose in our model, but the latter is more
costly. Finally, that ∗ is increasing in firm value illustrates why empirical correlations between
firm-level governance and firm value should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, in our model,
the causality goes the other way: Higher firm value implies that more private benefits can be
converted into pledgeable security benefits by way of firm-level governance.
Inserting bidder ’s optimal choice of firm-level governance, (55), into his maximum oﬀer
function, (54), we obtain the highest oﬀer which he is willing and able to make:
b = min½  + 
1 + (1− )
¾
−  (56)
26 If the bidder increased  beyond this point, the binding constraint in (54) would become again the partici-
pation constraint, implying the bidder’s maximum oﬀer would be decreasing in  Accordingly, “optimal” means
that ∗ is the choice of firm-level governance that maximizes bidder ’s likelihood of winning the takeover contest.
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where b =  −  if and only if (1− ) ≤ 
Accordingly, if bidder  is suﬃciently wealthy ( ≥ ) he is both willing and able to make
a bid up to his full valuation of the target,  −  regardless of the quality of legal investor
protection. Moreover, in this case, we know from (55) that his optimal choice of firm-level
governance is ∗ = 0 In contrast, if    there exists a critical value 0 = − such that
bidder ’s maximum oﬀer is less than his full valuation if   0 and equal to his full valuation if
 ≥ 0 In the former case, bidder ’s maximum oﬀer is increasing in  while his optimal choice
of firm-level governance is ∗  0 with 
∗
  0 and ∗ → 0 as → 
0
We can again compare under what conditions bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer, b1 exceeds bidder
2’s maximum oﬀer, b2
LEMMA 12: Bidder 1 wins the takeover contest if and only if
1 ≥ min©(1− )2 2ª− (1 − 2)  (57)
As in our basic competition model, stronger legal investor protection promotes eﬃcient
takeover outcomes. Formally, if 1 ≥ min{2 2} − (1−2)  the takeover outcome is eﬃcient
for any value of  In all other cases, there exists a critical value 00  0 such that the outcome
is eﬃcient if and only if  ≥ 00
These benefits of legal investor protection notwithstanding, allowing for firm-level governance
may render legal investor protection redundant. To illustrate, consider the extreme case in which
the costs of firm-level governance approach zero ( → 0) In this case, condition (57) implies
that bidder 1 always wins the takeover contest, regardless of his private wealth or the quality
of legal investor protection. Intuitively, the role of legal investor protection in our model is to
provide bidders with pledgeable income, while that of private wealth is to make up for shortfalls
in bidders’ pledgeable income. However, if bidders can costlessly convert private benefits into
pledgeable security benefits, neither legal investor protection nor the bidders’ private wealth
matter for eﬃciency.
More generally, allowing for firm-level governance, even if costly, makes it more likely that
the target goes to the bidder who creates the most value. This is because higher-value bidders
have more private benefits that can be converted into security benefits, which gives their outside
funding capacity a greater boost.
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PROPOSITION 9: Under eﬀective competition for the target, firm-level governance may improve
the eﬃciency of the takeover outcome. The improvement is larger when legal investor protection
is weak, when the costs of firm-level governance are low, and when the diﬀerence in firm values
created by the bidders is large.
As an illustration of how firm-level governance can improve eﬃciency, suppose that1  2 
2 (implying 1  1)27 By condition (11), this implies that, without firm-level governance,
bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer is b1 = ¯1 +min©(1− )1 1ª−  while bidder 2’s is b2 = 2 − 
Thus, by Lemma 3, bidder 1 loses the takeover contest if ¯  2−11 
Suppose now we allow firm-level governance, thus allowing bidders to convert private benefits
into pledgeable security benefits. By Lemma 11, bidder 2 optimally sets ∗2 = 0 implying his
maximum oﬀer remains unchanged. In contrast, bidder 1 sets ∗1 = 0 for all ¯  1−11 but
∗1 = (1−)1−11+(1−)  0 for all ¯ ≤ 1−11  In the latter case, bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer increases tob1 = 1+11+(1−) −  (see equation (56)).
The upward shift of bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer function makes it more likely that bidder 1
succeeds, thereby improving eﬃciency. While the takeover outcome was, and still is, eﬃcient
if ¯ ≥ 2−11 , it was previously–i.e., without firm-level governance–ineﬃcient if ¯  2−11 .
Introducing firm-level governance narrows the range of ¯−values for which the takeover outcome
is ineﬃcient. Precisely, by Lemma 12, bidder 1 loses the takeover contest if ¯  2−1+(2−1)2 
which is less than the respective threshold value without firm-level governance, 2−11 . In fact,
if the cost of firm-level governance is suﬃciently small ( ≤ 1−22−1 ), bidder 1 always wins,
irrespective of the quality of legal investor protection.
VII. Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀect of legal investor protection on the eﬃciency of the market for
corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which the bidder, once
in control, can divert corporate resources as private benefits. This has two main implications.
First, it reduces the bidder’s profit, thus making eﬃcient takeovers less likely. Second, it increases
the bidder’s pledgeable income and thus his outside funding capacity. However, absent eﬀective
27Any (non-trivial) claims made in this example are proven in Appendix B.
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bidding competition, this increased outside funding capacity does not relax the bidder’s budget
constraint, as the bid price increases in lockstep with his pledgeable income.
In contrast, under eﬀective bidding competition, stronger legal investor protection–and the
associated increase in the bidders’ outside funding capacity–may improve the eﬃciency of the
takeover outcome. In particular, by boosting bidders’ ability to raise outside funds against the
value which they create, stronger legal investor protection makes it less likely that more eﬃcient
but less wealthy bidders are outbid by less eﬃcient but wealthier rivals.
The presence of a binding budget constraint also provides a novel rationale for the “one
share—one vote” rule. In our model, such a rule is socially optimal, as it maximizes the likelihood
that the takeover outcome is determined by bidders’ ability to create value rather than by their
budget constraints. In addition, our model provides novel empirical implications relating the
takeover outcome to, firm-level governance, margin requirements, asset tangibility, and block
ownership, to name just a few.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2 : For a bid to succeed in equilibrium, it must satisfy the free-rider condition,
 ≥ . If no bid satisfies this condition, the only equilibrium outcome is that the takeover does
not place. Suppose therefore that a bid satisfies  ≥ . If a target shareholder anticipates
the bid to succeed, tendering his shares is (at least) a weakly dominant strategy. Hence, an
equilibrium exists in which a bid  succeeds if and only if  ≥ . Among all equilibria, the
target shareholders’ payoﬀ is highest in those in which the highest bid succeeds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3 : For a bid to succeed under competition, it would a fortiori also have to
succeed absent competition. By Lemma 1, this is true if and only if condition (12) holds.
Moreover, in a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, bidder 1 wins the takeover contest only if b1 ≥ b2.
Using expression (11), this can be written as
¯1 +min©(1− )1 1ª−  ≥ ¯2 +min©(1− )2 2ª−  (58)
or
min
©
(1− )1 1ª ≥ min©(1− )2 2ª− (1 − 2) (59)
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If (1− )1 ≤ 1 this condition always holds because
(1− )1  (1− )2 − (1 − 2) ≥ min©(1− )2 2ª− (1 − 2) (60)
Hence, condition (59) can be written as condition (13). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8 : Suppose bidder  bids  for voting shares and 0 for non-voting shares.
Who wins the takeover contest is determined solely by the bids for voting shares. Hence, in a
Pareto-dominant equilibrium (for the voting shareholders), the winning bid is the highest among
those satisfying  ≥  if any. If bidder  fails to gain control, his bid for non-voting shares
is irrelevant. (Bids for non-voting shares are conditional upon gaining control.) Conversely, if
bidder  gains control, non-voting shareholders tender only if 0 ≥ . In this case, the winning
bidder’s payoﬀ is
 ¡ − ¢+ (1− ) ¡ − 0 ¢+ ¡1− ¢  (61)
Given the requirement that 0 ≥  expression (61) is maximized for 0 =  in which case
it becomes
 ¡ − ¢+ ¡1− ¢  (62)
which is the same as if bidder  did not bid for non-voting shares. Consequently, bidder  is
indiﬀerent between bidding and not bidding for non-voting shares: He makes zero profit on these
shares, and they do not help him gain control. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 10 : The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3 with  = 0 and expression (11)
replaced by (36) for the bidder and
b0 = 0 + 1 · (1− )0 (63)
for the incumbent, respectively. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9 : The result follows from comparing condition (57) with the corresponding
requirement from Section III, condition (13), noting that
1 − 2
  1 − 2  (1 − 2) (64)
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for all   1 and   1 and that ( 1 − )(1 − 2) is decreasing in  and  and increasing in
1 − 2 Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Example Following Proposition 9
Recall that 1  2  2 (implying that 1  1) The first unproven claim is that raising
bidder 1’s maximum oﬀer from b1 = 1+1−  to b1 = 1+11+(1−) −  for all ¯ ≤ 1−11 narrows
the range of ¯−values where the takeover outcome is ineﬃcient, i.e., where bidder 1 loses. Given
that bidder 2’s maximum oﬀer was, and still is, b2 = 2− the takeover outcome was previously
(i.e., without firm-level governance) ineﬃcient if 1 + 1  2 or   2−11  In contrast, it is
now ineﬃcient if 1+1
1+(1−)  2 or   2−1+(2−1)2  To prove that 2−1+(2−1)2  2−11  it
suﬃces to show that 1+1
1+(1−) lies strictly above 1 + 1 for all ¯  1−11  To see this, note
that 1+1
1+(1−) = ¯1 + 1 at  = 1−11 with derivative  1+11+(1−)
¯¯¯
¯= 1−11
= 1  1 That
1+1
1+(1−) is strictly increasing and convex in  completes the proof.
The second unproven claim is that if  ≤ 1−22−1  bidder 1 wins the takeover contest for all
 To see this, recall that b1 = 1+11+(1−) −  is strictly increasing in  Hence, we have thatb1 ≥ b2 = 2 −  for all  if 1+11+ ≥ 2 or  ≤ 1−22−1  Indeed, if 1+12 ≥ 2 we have that
1−22−1 ≥ 1 In this latter case, bidder 1 wins the takeover contest for all  even as  → 1
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